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Cable Television: Local Governmental
Regulation in Perspective
John L. Growt
I. Introduction
With the enactment of the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984,' Congress specified comprehensive national objec-
tives for cable television for the first time. These objectives are
consistent with those advanced by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) and substantially upheld by the courts with
respect to broadcast television and cable television. The statute
further established a regulatory framework within which local
governmental, i.e. state and municipal, franchising is essential to
the fulfillment of national communications policy.
Despite congressional action, the extent of local governmen-
tal authority to regulate cable television by means of a franchis-
ing process remains uncertain. The focus of the current debate is
the first amendment. The issue concerns the proper balancing of
governmental interests in cable television and the interests of
the individuals and companies involved in cable construction,
operation and programming.
Part II of this Article will review the fundamental principles
underlying the regulation of broadcasting by the FCC and the
application of such principles to cable television through 1975.
Part II will also discuss the basis for and the extent of local gov-
ernmental regulation of cable television under both FCC policy
and the Cable Communications Policy Act. Part III discusses
the current debate over the first amendment rights of cable tele-
vision, including in particular, efforts to distinguish cable televi-
sion from broadcast television for the purpose of establishing a
t John L. Grow is Counsel to the New York State Commission on Cable Television
in Albany, New York. He is a graduate of Colgate University and Albany Law School of
Union University. The views herein are those of the author.
1. 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. III 1985). See infra text accompanying notes 69-106.
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separate first amendment standard of review. The Article con-
cludes in Part IV by affirming an important regulatory role for
local government.
II. Background
A. Early Regulation of Television Broadcasting
From its inception, television broadcasting was subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) in accordance with the Communications Act of 1934.2
The Communications Act was enacted by Congress "under the
spur of a widespread fear that in the absence of governmental
control the public interest might be subordinated to monopolis-
tic domination in the broadcasting field . . . [and in order] to
maintain, through appropriate administrative control, a grip on
the dynamic aspects of radio transmission." 3 The statute applied
to "all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio...
to all persons engaged within the United States in such commu-
nication ... and to the licensing and regulating of all radio sta-
tions."4 The FCC was created "[flor the purpose of regulating
interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and
radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people
of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-
wide wire and radio communication service. ' 5
Under the Communications Act, no person can engage in
broadcasting without a license and no license can be obtained
unless the "public convenience, interest, or necessity ... [would]
be served thereby."' Licenses are limited in duration to a term
of years7 and cannot "be construed to create any right, beyond
the terms, conditions, and periods . . . [thereof]." 8 The FCC is
directed to distribute licenses "among the several States and
communities so as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable dis-
tribution of radio service to each of the same."9 Section 303 of
2. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-559 (1982).
3. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940).
4. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982).
5. Id. § 151.
6. Id. § 307(a).
7. Id. § 307(d).
8. Id. § 301.
9. Id. § 307(b).
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the statute confers additional, specific powers on the FCC also
to be exercised as the "public convenience, interest, or necessity
requires."' 0
The Communications Act contains two significant limita-
tions on the FCC's authority over broadcasting. Section 153(h)
provides that "a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not,
insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common car-
rier."" Section 326 explicitly denies the FCC the power to cen-
sor or to "interfere with the right of free speech by means of
radio communication." 2
From the beginning, the prevailing rationale for governmen-
tal licensing has been the limited number of frequencies availa-
ble for broadcasting, and thus for broadcasters. This so-called
"scarcity rationale" has two dimensions. First, the interference
caused by conflicting use of the same frequency results in confu-
sion and chaos. Second, the limitation on the number of sepa-
rate frequencies requires consideration of the appropriate use of
frequencies that are available. The first dimension requires allo-
cation; the second requires standards for utilization of a limited
resource.
By the end of World War II, it was well established that the
FCC possessed broad authority under the public interest stan-
dard in the Communications Act to promote diversity of infor-
mation and information sources in broadcasting.13 Specifically,
10. Id. § 303. The FCC has the additional power to "[situdy new uses for radio,
provide for experimental uses of frequencies, and generally encourage the larger and
more effective use of radio in the public interest;" id. § 303(g); and the specific power to
"[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not
inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter ...
." Id. § 303(r).
11. Id. § 153(h). "Common carrier" or "carrier" is defined as "any person engaged as
a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or [in]
interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy, except where reference is made to
common carriers not subject to this chapter; but a person engaged in radio broadcasting
shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier." Id.
12. Id. § 326.
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission
the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by
any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by
the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of
radio transmission.
Id.
13. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); FCC v. Potts-
19861
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Supreme Court decisions in the 1940's emphasized 1) the discre-
tion of the FCC to determine the public interest with respect to
licensing matters and 2) the responsibility of the FCC to pro-
mote and enhance the public benefit to be derived from broad-
casting by subordinating the interests of the licensee to the in-
terests of the listeners and viewers." The Communications Act
as it had then been applied by the FCC and upheld by the Su-
preme Court was not designed merely to encourage broadcasting
by the orderly allocation of frequencies but to promote the "best
practicable [broadcasting] service to the community."1 5
Perhaps the most significant of the early cases was National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States,16 where the Court sustained
the authority of the FCC to promulgate chain broadcasting regu-
lations." The Court referred to an FCC report on the status of
the radio broadcasting industry in 1938 which found that more
than one-half of the commercial stations were affiliated with one
of three major radio broadcasting networks and that such sta-
tions "utilized more than 97% of the total night-time broadcast-
ing power of all the stations in the country ... [and that the two
largest networks] controlled more than 85% of the total night-
time wattage."18 The Court found that "[tihe 'public interest' to
be served under the Communications Act is ... the interest of
ville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470 (1940).
14. In Pottsville Broadcasting, the Supreme Court denied a license applicant's claim
to rights of priority in a license. The Court sustained an FCC decision which required
the applicant to participate in a competitive licensing proceeding even where the same
applicant's initial effort to obtain a license was denied because of an erroneous applica-
tion of state law by the FCC. The applicant's participation in the competitive proceeding
was required notwithstanding the fact that its competitors for the license first emerged
after the applicant was denied the license. In Sanders Bros., the Court upheld an FCC
decision to grant a second license in the same community over objection of the existing
licensee that he would suffer economic injury. The FCC had found that both applicants
were qualified and that there was a need in the community for the license for both
broadcast services. The Court ruled that "no person is to have anything in the nature of
a property right as a result of the granting of a license .... [I]t is not the purpose of the
Act to protect a licensee against competition. Id. at 475.
15. Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 475.
16. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
17. Id. The regulations applied to a variety of matters including exclusive affiliation
agreements, territorial exclusivity, rights to reject programs and network ownership of
stations. Id. at 198-209.
18. Id. at 197-98.
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the listening public in 'the larger and more effective use of
radio.' "19
The Court rejected the contention that the regulations vio-
lated appellants' right of free speech under the first amendment.
After finding that "radio inherently is not available to all" 20 and
is, therefore, subject to governmental regulation, the Court con-
cluded that "[t]he right of free speech does not include ... the
right to use the facilities of radio without a license" and that
"[d]enial of a station license on ... [the ground of public inter-
est, convenience or necessity] if valid under the Act, is not a
denial of free speech.
21
B. The Advent of Cable Television
Cable television systems (CATVs) were first constructed in
the United States around 1950. The purpose of the early CATVs
was to bring the signals of broadcast television to predominantly
rural, usually low-lying, areas where "off air" reception by ordi-
nary roof-top antennaes was inadequate. An antenna was in-
stalled at an elevated site to receive and amplify the signals of
nearby stations which were then distributed by coaxial cable to
television receivers in homes throughout the community. Gener-
ally, the transmission facilities and equipment of the system
were located in and along the public right-of-way entirely within
the boundaries of a single state. At the very beginning, only the
signals of local stations were carried. With the development of
microwave relay service, systems soon began to receive and dis-
tribute broadcast signals from distant stations. 22 In both in-
stances, the programming available on the systems was essen-
tially, if not exclusively, the same programming provided on
broadcast frequencies licensed by the FCC.
19. Id. at 216.
20. Id. at 226.
21. Id. at 227.
22. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 163 (1968). For an expo-
sition on the growth of cable television, see infra note 26.
19861
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1. The Beginning of Federal Regulation: An Emerging
Policy of Diversity
In the 1950's, the FCC determined that it lacked the neces-
sary statutory authority to regulate cable television.23 By 1962,
the Commission reversed itself and asserted jurisdiction over
systems utilizing microwave facilities.2 4 Later, in 1966, it as-
serted jurisdiction over all cable television systems by adopting
rules essentially designed to protect broadcasting from the po-
tential economic harm posed by cable.25
In 1968, in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,2" the
Supreme Court upheld FCC jurisdiction over cable television
based upon section 152(a) of the Communications Act. Although
section 152(a) pertained to communications by both wire and ra-
dio,27 the Court determined that the essential feature of cable
television was the retransmission of broadcast television sig-
nals - an interstate service - and limited its review of the
23. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958); recon. denied in con-
junction with Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, 428-29 (1959).
24. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 359
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). See also Rules re Microwave - Served
CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
25. Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966), aff'd, Black Hills Video Corp.
v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968).
26. 392 U.S. 157 (1968). After reviewing the rapid growth of the CATV industry and
the technical potential for program production, the Court observed that "CATV systems
perform either or both of two functions. First, they may supplement broadcasting by
facilitating satisfactory reception of local stations ... and second, they may transmit to
subscribers the signals of distant stations entirely beyond the range of local antennae."
Id. at 163. Since television broadcasting is interstate and because CATV systems served
as an extension of broadcasting, the Court concluded that "[t]o categorize respondents'
activities as intrastate would disregard the character of the television industry, and serve
merely to prevent the national regulation that 'is not only appropriate but essential to
the efficient use of radio facilities.'" Id. at 169 (quoting Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson
Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279 (1933)). In the same year, the Court also determined that
CATV carriage of broadcast signals did not constitute a performance of the programs
causing liability for copyright payments. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television
Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). In this context the Court stated "[tihe function of CATV sys-
tems has little in common with the function of broadcasters. CATV systems do not in
fact broadcast or rebroadcast. Broadcasters select the programs to be viewed; CATV sys-
tems simply carry, without editing, whatever programs they receive." Id. at 400. The
Court adhered to its holding in Fortnightly in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). In 1976, Congress did impose copyright liability
on cable television operators. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2553 (1976) (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 111 (1982)).
27. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 172-78.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/3
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FCC's authority over cable television to that "reasonably ancil-
lary to the effective performance of.. . [its] various responsbili-
ties for the regulation of television broadcasting. '"8
After Southwestern, the FCC acted early and often to for-
mulate federal policy for cable television. The emphasis of each
action was on the potential of cable television - as an emerg-
ing part of the national communications network - to contrib-
ute to the diversity of communication services, particularly the
diversity of programming available on television. 9 Significantly,
the first rules adopted by the FCC charged cable television oper-
ators with the duty to act substantially as broadcasters."0 For
example, the FCC ruled that cable systems with 3500 or more
subscribers must operate to a significant extent as a local outlet
for community expression and, in the process, comply with the
equal-time provisions of section 315 of the Communications
Act,31 the sponsorship identification provisions of section 317 of
28. Id. at 178. "The Commission may, for these purposes, issue 'such rules and regu-
lations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law,' as
'public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.' . . . We express no views as to the
Commission's authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any circumstances or for any
other purposes." Id. (citation omitted).
29. The FCC was, no doubt, encouraged by the unanimous decision of the Supreme
Court upholding the fairness doctrine applicable to broadcast licensees in Red Lion
Broadcasting, Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Although the Court refused to decide
whether diversity as an end in itself - separate and distinct from the issue of scar-
city - might justify congressional regulation of broadcasting, its ruling was decidedly
pro-diversity. Id. at 401 n.28. The Court emphasized that broadcasting uses public air-
waves, requires government allocation of frequencies to make speech intelligible and that
the rights of licensees cannot be superior to the rights of the public. Indeed, the decision
of the government to issue licenses to private parties has its basis in the first amend-
ment. Thus, there is a "First Amendment goal of producing an informed public capable
of conducting its own affairs" id. at 392; and "the people as a whole retain their interest
in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consist-
ently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral, and other ideas and exper-
iences which is crucial here." Id. at 390.
30. First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) provides in part that "[i]f any licensee shall permit
any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting
station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in
the use of such broadcasting station." In 1974, the section was amended expressly to
include the use of cable television systems.
7
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the Act 32 and the "fairness doctrine. '3 3 The imposition of an af-
firmative obligation to originate programming of interest to the
local community was a clear statement by the FCC that cable
television technology should not be used solely as a conduit for
broadcast programming.3 4 The origination rules permitted an
operator to cablecast CATV network programming, but the
main purpose of the rules was to provide an additional outlet for
local expression.35
At the same time, the FCC expressed the opinion that com-
mon carrier status should be imposed on some cable television
channels.3 6 Such status would be consistent with the potential to
provide diverse programming sources and also with the FCC's
view that "one entity should not control the content of the pro-
gram materials on all cable channels not used for carriage of
broadcast signals."3 " Since it lacked the authority to impose
common carrier status on broadcasters, the FCC's tentative de-
termination to impose carrier status on cable television sug-
gested an expansive interpretation of the Southwestern decision.
In addition, the FCC specifically rejected the claim that the
origination rules abridged first amendment rights of cable televi-
32. 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) provides in part:
All matter broadcast by any radio station for which any money, service or other
valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or promised to or charged or
accepted by, the station so broadcasting, from any person, shall, at the time the
same is so broadcast, be announced as paid for or furnished, as the case may be,
by such person.
33. The fairness doctrine imposes a two-fold duty upon broadcasters. First, a licen-
see is required to devote a reasonable amount of time to the coverage of controversial
issues of public importance. Second, a licensee must provide a reasonable opportunity
for the presentation of contrasting points of view. It should be noted that the FCC no
longer supports the fairness doctrine. Report and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 143 (1985).
34. "[W]e do not think, given the present broadcast mode of operations, that signifi-
cant additional program choice can be obtained by simply adding more broadcast signals
to provide 20-40 channels of programming to subscribers." First Report and Order, 20
F.C.C.2d at 206.
35. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, 827 (1970). The FCC subse-
quently amended the rules to prevent a cable operator from entering into "any arrange-
ment which inhibits or prevents the substantial use of the cable facilities for local pro-
gramming designed to inform the public on issues of public importance." Id.
36. 20 F.C.C.2d at 206-07. "There is ... in our opinion, a need for additional means
by which various entities can communicate with the public via television at low cost ....
[lilt is our opinion that the public interest would be served by encouraging CATV sys-
tems to operate as common carriers on some channels."
37. Id. at 206.
[Vol. 7:81
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sion operators. Quoting liberally from Southwestern and early
broadcast cases, the FCC stated that "[s]ince CATV systems use
broadcast signals as the backbone of the service they provide,
they come within the regulation of this agency, if reasonably re-
lated to the public interest. If the regulation is so related, it is
not barred by the first amendment." 38 The FCC went on to state
that "[i]t is thus immaterial that the scarcity of frequencies ra-
tionale underlying first amendment rulings in the broadcast field
does not apply directly to the cable technology.""
With program origination rules firmly in place, the FCC ac-
ted promptly to ensure the development of an independent
cable television industry separate from the telephone and broad-
casting industries. In January, 1970, rules were adopted which
precluded a telephone company, either directly or through affili-
ates, from selling cable television service to the viewing public in
its own service territory.40 The rules also required telephone
companies to discontinue cable television service in their service
areas within a period of four years."' In support of its rules, the
FCC expressed concern about the extension of telephone com-
pany monopolies and about the anti-competitive consequences
of telephone company ownership of cable, including the deter-
rent effect on other potential entrants into the cable television
business. 4 2 In this context, the FCC assumed that all cable
televison systems would be constructed on existing utility prop-
38. Id. at 222 (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 222 n.27.
40. Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, recon. in part, 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970),
aff'd sub. nom., General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
41. Id. at 326. Telephone companies are now prevented by statute from selling cable
service in their service areas, except upon special waivers granted by the FCC for the
provision of cable service in rural areas. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
42. However, the FCC did not fully explain how the provision of cable television
service by a telephone company would interfere with national objectives underlying the
broadcast signal carriage rules and common carrier status promised although not then
imposed. In fact, the rationale for the FCC's decision was the potential for competition
in the development of non-video broadband communication services by independently
owned cable television companies.
We believe that the public interest in modern and efficient means of communica-
tions will be best served, at this time, by preserving, to the extent practicable, a
competitive environment for the development and use of broadband cable facili-
ties and services and thereby avoid undue and unnecessary concentration of con-
trol over communications media either by existing carriers or other entities.
Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d at 325.
19861
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erty and that local governments could deny cable television op-
erators permission to erect their own poles and conduits.4"
In June, 1970, the FCC adopted rules prohibiting "cross
ownership" of cable television systems and television broadcast
stations in the same market.44 The FCC noted CATV's develop-
ing role as an "opinion molder"45 and concluded that the rule
"would further the Commission's policy favoring diversity of
control over local mass communications media."4 The FCC also
recognized that there was a separate CATV subscribing portion
of the public which was entitled to diversity of control and pro-
gramming.47 Finally, the Commission expressed the opinion that
it had "authority to adopt ownership rules governing CATV sys-
tems directly, including the matter of cross-ownership interest
with newspapers over whom the Commission has no indepen-
dent licensing authority. 48
In early 1972, the FCC adopted comprehensive regulations
for cable television including: 1) access channel requirements, 2)
detailed broadcast signal carriage and program exclusivity rules,
3) technical standards, and 4) local franchising and federal certi-
fication requirements.49 The regulations were "designed to allow
43. Id. at n.6. "The CATV system would normally have to use the same set of poles
or conduits as the telephone company, because the communities generally will not per-
mit the construction of duplicate sets of poles or conduits." See infra note 54.
44. Second Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 816 (1970), recon. denied in part, 39
F.C.C.2d 377 (1973); see also Second Report and Order, 55 F.C.C.2d 540 (1975), recon.
denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 596 (1976) codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1985); Third Report and
Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 65 (1984) recon. denied, FCC Docket No. MM 85-232 (5/3/85). A
similar restriction is now contained in 47 U.S.C. § 533(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
45. 23 F.C.C.2d at 817.
46. Id. at 820.
47. Id. at 820-21.
48. Id. at 822. In 1975, the FCC adopted rules limiting common ownership of a radio
or television broadcast station and a daily newspaper located in the same community.
Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975). The rules were upheld by the Su-
preme Court in FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
The Court rejected the contention by newspaper owners that the cross-ownership restric-
tions violated their first amendment rights. "We cannot agree, for this argument ignores
the fundamental proposition that there is no 'unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or publish.'" Id. at
799 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969)).
49. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972). In June, 1972, the
Supreme Court upheld the FCC's mandatory origination rules for cable systems by a
narrow margin in United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972). The Court
noted that the "regulatory authority ... generally sustained .. .in Southwestern was
[Vol. 7:81
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for fulfillment of the technological promise of cable and, at the
same time, to maintain the existing structure of broadcast televi-
sion."50 In adopting regulations requiring the designation of cer-
tain channels for public, governmental and educational access,
the FCC identified a specific role for cable television as follows:
Broadcast signals are being used as a basic component in the es-
tablishment of cable systems, and it is therefore appropriate that
the fundamental goals of a national communications structure be
furthered by cable - the opening of new outlets for local expres-
sion, the promotion of diversity in television programming, the
advancement of educational and instructional television, and in-
creased informational services of local governments. 1
The regulatory program was implemented by standards that
applied directly to cable television systems and by additional
minimum standards that governed the award and content of
cable television franchises. Since a local franchise was generally
a condition to a certificate of compliance - the equivalent of a
federal license52 - the FCC was able to enforce rules against
both cable operators and local governments. It should also be
noted that many substantive federal rules were preemptive of
local authority. For example, a local franchise could not impose
access requirements in excess of those expressly permitted by
FCC rules. These limitations on local authority applied even in
areas outside the top 100 television markets, where FCC access
rules generally did not apply.
authority to regulate CATV with a view not merely to protect but to promote the objec-
tives for which the Commission had been assigned jurisdiction over broadcasting;" Id. at
667; and approved of regulatory efforts aimed at increasing "the number of local outlets
for community self-expression and [augmenting] the public's choice of programs and
types of service[s]." Id at 651 (citation omitted). "The effect of the regulation after all, is
to assure that in the retransmission of broadcast signals viewers are provided suitably
diversified programming - the same objective underlying regulations sustained in Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States . . . as well as the local-carriage rule reviewed
in Southwestern and subsequently upheld." Id. at 669.
50. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 147.
51. Id. at 190. FCC access rules were invalidated by the Supreme Court in FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The Court concluded that the rules exceeded
the FCC's authority because they imposed common carrier status on cable television op-
erators - a status that could not be imposed on broadcasters under the Communica-
tions Act. The Court did not reach the first amendment issue.
52. 47 C.F.R. § 76.11 (1985).
1986]
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2. Local Regulation
Cable television, by its very nature, creates a tension be-
tween the respective interests of federal and non-federal levels
of government. The transmission of video signals by wires at-
tached to poles on public property invokes the historic
power - indeed the responsibility - of state and local gov-
ernments to ensure that public streets are used for public pur-
poses. 53 On the other hand, cable television began as a business
engaged in the retail sale of retransmitted interstate broadcast
television signals. Some regulatory role was proper and neces-
sary for federal, state and local governments. The determination
of the FCC to specifically and actively regulate the growth and
development of a separate cable televison industry through pre-
emptive federal standards contributed to the tension.
The division of regulatory responsibility between the FCC
and state governments or their political subdivisions was a criti-
cal issue in the formation of federal policy. Both the courts and
the FCC had previously conceded the local aspects of cable tele-
vision. 5" The FCC proposed three approaches: 1) federal licens-
ing of all cable systems; 2) maintenance of the current federal
regulatory program enforced by section 312(b) proceedings; and
3) federal regulation of some aspects, with local regulation of
others under federal prescription of standards for local jurisdic-
tions.55 The consideration of the first two enumerated ap-
proaches implied the authority to regulate cable television exclu-
sively at the federal level, i.e., that local governmental consent in
53. City of New York v. Rice, 198 N.Y. 124, 91 N.E. 283 (1910); American Rapid
Tel. Co. v. Hess, 125 N.Y. 641, 26 N.E. 919 (1891).
54. The local aspects of cable television were early described in TV Pix, Inc. v. Tay-
lor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968) as follows:
The apparatus of the community antenna system is an appendage to the primary
interstate broadcasting facilities with incidents much more local than national,
involving cable equipment through the public streets and ways, local franchises,
local intra-state advertising and selling of services and local intra-state collections.
In this perspective, a community antenna system is essentially a local business...
[and] these are subjects which lend themselves naturally to local control and
supervision.
Id. at 463.
55. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 25 F.C.C.2d 50 (1970). Section 312(b) autho-
rizes the FCC to enforce the statute, its regulations and the condition of the license by
the issuance of cease and desist orders. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1982).
[Vol. 7:81
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the form of a "street franchise" was not necessary for the lawful
construction of a cable television system. Adoption of the third
approach appeared to constitute a determination that some local
governmental action was essential.56
In its Cable Television Report and Order, the FCC codified
dual jurisdiction over cable, stating that:
Conventional licensing would place an unmanageable burden on
the Commission. Moreover, local governments are inescapably in-
volved in the process because cable makes use of streets and ways
and because local authorities are able to bring a special expert-
ness to such matters, for example, as how best to parcel large ur-
ban areas into cable districts .... Under the circumstances, a de-
liberately structured dualism is indicated; the industry seems
uniquely suited to this kind of creative federalism.57
For local government, this "dualism" - subject to FCC mini-
mum standards - included the authority to: 1) select the fran-
chisee in a public proceeding; 2) determine the duration of the
franchise; 3) approve initial rates and any subsequent changes
for regular subscriber service; and 4) review and approve the
franchisee's subscriber complaint procedures.58 The local govern-
ment was also responsible for determining the service area and
the precise timetable for construction. In part, this local role was
consistent with the long-standing emphasis upon localism and
the fulfillment of community needs in broadcasting. Ironically,
such fundamentally local issues as program origination and ac-
cess channels were reserved by the FCC for its own determina-
tion. Even local franchise fees were subject to a federally im-
posed ceiling.
In 1975, the FCC reported on an inquiry concerning dupli-
cative and excessive over-regulation of cable television.5 9 The
Commission expressed concern over allegations of duplicative
regulation but refused to insist upon an exclusive "two-tier" ap-
proach. "The decision on the allocation of existing powers within
a state must be left to that state. While we strongly urge all
states to refrain from adopting unnecessarily duplicative regula-
56. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
57. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 207 (1972).
58. Id. at 207-09.
59. Report and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 855 (1975).
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tions, we believe it imprudent for us to attempt to impose a
strict, inflexible, 'two-tier' approach to cable regulation."60
We have concluded that while nonduplicative regulation is a wor-
thy objective, the jurisdictional impediments, particularly for an
agency such as this one, without clear Congressional guidance on
the subject, would present major, although not necessarily insur-
mountable, difficulties .... In an effort to clarify and delineate
the role of this Commission as well as non-federal regulators in
the development of cable communications, we have concluded
that the most appropriate course would be to secure legislation
from Congress.6 1
The FCC recited its view on the federal/state issue:
The ultimate dividing line, as we see it, rests on the distinction
between reasonable regulations regarding use of the streets and
rights-of-way and the regulation of the operational aspects of
cable communications. The former is clearly within the jurisdic-
tion of the states and their political subdivisions. The latter, to
the degree exercised, is within the jurisdiction of this Commis-
sion. This is so because of the inter-state nature of the medium as
enunciated by the Supreme Court.62
As noted, FCC rules adopted before 1972 required a cable
system to obtain a certificate of compliance from the Commis-
sion as a condition of carriage of broadcast signals. The applica-
tion for such a certificate required a copy of the franchise agree-
ment and a detailed statement showing that the franchising
authority had considered the system operator's qualifications."
However, the FCC never conceded that a franchise was a prereq-
uisite for use of streets. For example, neither the definition of
cable television system in section 76.5(a) of the FCC rules,64 nor
the exemption conferred upon master antenna television sys-
tems (MATV), referred to the use of public streets or rights-of-
way. Indeed, the FCC anticipated the existence of areas where
local governments would not assert the authority to grant a
60. Id. at 863 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 866.
62. Id. at 861 (citing United States v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (1968) and
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972)).
63. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 207 (1972).
64. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a) (1985).
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cable television franchise, and it espoused a policy whereby a
cable operator would nonetheless be authorized to carry broad-
cast signals in such an area upon submission of an "alternate
proposal" for fulfillment of Commission regulatory policy.
In retrospect, the statement that "local governments are in-
escapably involved in the process because cable makes use of
streets'" 5 seems more a practical accommodation to local inter-
ests than a commitment to the principle that the construction of
a cable system in the public right-of-way requires a local
franchise. In 1980, the FCC referred to the "1972 Cable Televi-
sion Report and Order wherein ... [it] relinquished franchising
jurisdiction to non-federal agencies."' 66 In the same decision, the
Commission noted that its "decision to share regulatory respon-
sibility over cable television with non-federal authorities . . .
[did] not in any way qualify . .. [its] jurisdiction over other
forms of interstate communications. ' e7 In 1983, with respect to
the issue of local regulation of Satellite Master Antenna Televi-
sion systems (SMATV), the FCC stated:
[w]e agree with the petitioner that the Commission established
this duality as a policy decision, rather than as a matter of law,
based on franchised cable's use of the public streets and rights of
way and the particular local interests considered applicable to a
cable operator, generally chosen to serve the community as a
whole. 8
65. 36 F.C.C.2d at 207. See supra text accompanying note 57.
66. Orth-O-Vision, Inc., 82 F.C.C.2d 178, 183 (1980) (emphasis added), aff'd, New
York State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 669 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1982). The FCC
preempted local regulation of MATV systems to the extent necessary to promote the
growth of interstate Multi-Distribution Services (MDS).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., 95 F.C.C.2d 1223, 1234 (1983) (emphasis
added), aff'd, New York State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804
(D.C.Cir. 1984). The FCC preempted entry regulation by local government of Satellite
Master Antenna Television systems (SMATV) to promote the development of interstate
transmission of satellite signals (Direct Broadcast Services). See also Satellite Television
of New York Assocs. v. Finneran, 579 F. Supp. 1546 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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C. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
1. Purpose of the Act
The principal focus of the Cable Communications Policy
Act 9 is cable television as television. Section 521(3) of the stat-
ute provides that "the purposes of this title are to establish
guidelines for the exercise of federal, state, and local authority
with respect to the regulation of cable systems."70 "Cable sys-
tem" is defined generally to mean "a facility ... that is designed
to provide cable service which includes video programming and
which is provided to multiple subscribers within a commu-
nity."' 71 "Cable service" is the "one-way transmission to sub-
scribers of (i) video programming or (ii) other programming ser-
vice;"'72 "video programming" is "programming provided by, or
generally considered comparable to programming provided by, a
television broadcast station. ' 73 Although various purposes of the
statute are expressed in terms of cable communications, it is ap-
parent that Congress did not intend to alter the existing author-
ity over any communications service other than cable service."
Rather, it is the intent of Congress to "assure that cable commu-
nications provide and are encouraged to provide the widest pos-
sible diversity of information sources and services to the pub-
lic." 75 Thus, the underlying goal of the Cable Communications
Policy Act is to promote diversity in television - the same goal
that has defined federal policy and sustained FCC regulatory ef-
forts in broadcast television for fifty years.
2. Local Regulation
Under the Cable Communications Policy Act, it is unclear
whether the regulatory responsibilities of local governments are
based upon the sovereign power of each state to regulate the use
of its public streets or upon a delegation of power by Congress.
69. 47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. III 1985).
70. Id § 521(3).
71. Id. § 522(6).
72. Id. § 522(5).
73. Id. § 522(16).
74. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 60, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4666, 4697.
75. 47 U.S.C. § 521(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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For example, the statute provides that a "franchise shall be con-
strued to authorize the construction of a cable system over pub-
lic rights-of-way"7 and that a "franchising authority" includes
"any governmental entity empowered by Federal, State or local
law to grant a franchise. 7 7 On the other hand, the statute also
suggests that Congress may be the source of the cable television
franchising power, and furthermore that Congress has specifi-
cally delegated such power to the states.7 8 Whether the jurisdic-
tional basis is traditional or founded upon federal action or some
combination thereof, Congress has clearly expressed its determi-
nation in the Act to rely "on the local franchising process as the
primary means of cable television regulation 7 9 and, therefore,
the local franchising process is an important vehicle for further-
ing diversity.
Section 541(b) of the statute provides that "a cable operator
may not provide cable service without a franchise." 80 Section
522(8) defines a "franchise" as "an initial authorization or re-
newal thereof ... which authorizes the construction or operation
of a cable system." 8' There are distinctive aspects of a "cable
system" as defined in the statute. First, Congress has specifically
exempted a "facility that serves only to retransmit the television
signals of 1 or more television broadcast stations."8 Thus, sys-
tems which do not produce their own programming and simply
carry, without editing, whatever broadcast programs they receive
are not cable systems under the Act and are not encompassed
within the uniform national policy set forth in the statute.83 If,
76. Id. § 541(a)(2).
77. Id. § 521(9)(emphasis added).
78. Id. § 541(a)(1) ("A franchising authority may award, in accordance with the pro-
visions of this title, 1 or more franchises within its jurisdiction.").
79. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4656.
80. 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
81. Id. § 522(8).
82. Id. § 522(6).
83. Those who would argue that the authority to franchise a communications entity
engaged in interstate commerce emanates from Congress might also argue that these so-
called "non-cable systems" are free from all state and local regulation. If sustained, this
position would lend support to the contention that the determination of Congress to vest
state and local governments with regulatory responsibilites in the franchising process was
not based simply upon "street use" considerations. But see City of Los Angeles v. Pre-
ferred Communications, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986) in which the Supreme Court stated
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as it appears, state and local governments are not preempted
from requiring a franchise from (and otherwise regulating) such
systems, then it must be concluded that Congress has deter-
mined that the interstate nature of broadcasting alone requires
neither uniformity for such systems nor an explicit limitation of
the authority of state and local government to regulate such sys-
tems. Moreover, the interstate nature of broadcasting can no
longer be said to constitute the jurisdictional basis for national
policy over cable television. For example, if a system transmits
only local broadcast signals, it is not a cable system. If it subse-
quently adds a local, governmental or educational channel, it be-
comes a cable system. If a system does not transmit any broad-
cast signals, it is also a cable system. This policy is in direct
contrast with the former policy of the FCC. The FCC's jurisdic-
tion over cable television was based upon its statutory jurisdic-
tion over broadcasting and, consequently, the FCC definition of
a "cable television system" required the transmission of one or
more television broadcast signals.
A second distinctive aspect of the definition of "cable sys-
tem" in the Cable Communications Policy Act is that the exis-
tence of the cable system does not depend upon whether the fa-
cility uses or occupies public streets or rights-of-way except in
the case of an MATV system.84 Rather, a critical element of the
definition is the provision of some non-broadcast television to
"multiple subscribers." Under the Act, any facility which satis-
fies the definition of a "cable system" must obtain a franchise
from a franchising authority. Thus, the authority of state and
local government to regulate cable television is not necessarily
coincidental with - or, indeed, limited to - the powers and
purposes traditionally associated with the regulation of the use
of streets. Under the Act, the authority conferred upon state and
local governments creates an affirmative duty to "assure that
cable systems are responsive to the needs and interests of the
local community""5 and to encourage or require diversity in cer-
tain areas.
With respect to both objectives, Congress has detailed the
Congress has endorsed the franchising process. Id. at 2035 n.1.
84. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6)(B) (Supp. III 1985).
85. Id. § 521(2).
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nature and scope of the issues subject to regulation. The critical,
unifying objective of the regulatory scheme for cable television is
"to assure that cable systems provide the widest possible diver-
sity of information services and sources to the public, consistent
with the First Amendment's goal of a robust marketplace of
ideas - an environment of 'many tongues speaking many
voices.' "86 The road to "localism" and "diversity" chosen by
Congress includes deregulation of certain areas and the articula-
tion of specific statutory objectives to be served by local govern-
mental regulation.
First, a franchising authority may require that the fran-
chisee designate channel capacity for public, educational and
governmental use and channel capacity on institutional net-
works for educational and governmental use.8 7 Second, the
franchising authority may establish regulations for facilities and
equipment which include the authority to regulate channel ca-
pacity."' Third, a franchising authority may require an upgrade
of an existing system, including an expansion of channel capac-
ity, in the context of a franchise renewal.8 9
Perhaps the clearest expression of congressional intent con-
cerning diversity in cable television is found in section
532 - Cable channels for commercial use. This section requires
cable operators to make channels available for commercial use
"by persons unaffiliated with the operator," 0 precludes the exer-
cise by the operator of "any editorial control over any video pro-
gramming provided [on such channels]" '91 and provides specific
86. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4656.
87. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (b)(Supp. III 1985). "Local governments, school systems, and
community groups, for instance, will have ample opportunity to reach the public under.
. .[the Cable Communications Policy Act] ...." H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4656.
88. 47 U.S.C. § 544(b). "Facility and equipment requirements may include require-
ments which relate to channel capacity; system configuration and capacity, including in-
stitutional and subscriber networks; headends and hubs; two-way capability; addres-
sability; trunk and feeder cable; and any other facility or equipment requirement, which
is related to the establishment and operation of a cable system .... H.R. REP. No. 934,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4705.
89. 47 U.S.C. § 546(b).
90. Id. at § 532(b)(1).
91. Id. at § 532(c)(2).
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remedies to persons denied commercial access.2 The legislative
history of this section reveals that Congress recognized that
cable operators do not necessarily have the incentive to provide a
diversity of programming sources . . . [and that] [tihe Commit-
tee's overriding goal in adopting this section is divorcing cable op-
erator editorial control over a limited number of channels. In do-
ing so, the Committee does not intend to adversely affect the
cable operator's economic position, since it is not the cable opera-
tor's exercise of any economic power, but his exercise of editorial
control, which is of concern to the Committee.... [T]he market-
place cannot be relied upon to assure a diversity of viewpoints. 3
The provisions governing commercial access are mandatory
and pre-emptive. At this time, neither the FCC nor state or local
governments can impose additional requirements. However, the
statutory obligation to make channels available for leased use
does not apply unless the channel capacity of a particular sys-
tem is at least thirty-six. The potential for a critical local gov-
ernmental role even in the area of leased access is apparent. The
requirements for channel capacity in a franchise may well be the
determining factor in whether a particular system is subject to
mandatory leased access under section 532. 94
3. Cable Television Regulation and Use of the Public
Right-of- Way
Although local regulation of cable television may not de-
pend upon street use, the use of public property by cable televi-
sion facilities and equipment is not incidental. In Loretto v. Tel-
eprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,95 the Supreme Court held
92. Id. at §§ 532(d)-(f).
93. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, 50, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 4655, 4685 & 4687 (emphasis added).
94. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (Supp. III 1985). Of course, the cable operator may unilaterally
determine to provide a system with 36 or more channels either in a franchise or by the
unilateral act of upgrading during the term of the franchise. But, if an operator lacks the
incentive to provide a diversity of sources and, if the marketplace is unreliable, regula-
tion by the franchising authority may be the only method for insuring diversity. More-
over, given the local governmental authority to regulate channel capacity, the capacity,
the size of the system, and, therefore, the existence of mandatory leased access partakes
of governmental action and a franchising authority may be accountable to a would-be
commercial lessee on first amendment grounds.
95. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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that a state statute which conferred upon cable television fran-
chisees a right of access to private property for the purpose of
providing cable television service to tenants constituted a "tak-
ing" of property requiring just compensation. In describing the
nature of the taking involved, the Court quoted at length from
St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co.96 as follows:
The use which the [company] makes of the streets is an exclusive
and permanent one, and not one temporary, shifting and in com-
mon with the general public.... Whatever benefit the public may
receive in the way of transportation of messages, that space is, so
far as respects its actual use for purposes of highway and personal
travel, wholly lost to the public.... It matters not for what that
exclusive appropriation is taken, whether for steam railroads or
street railroads, telegraphs or telephones, the State may if it
chooses exact from the party or corporation given such exclusive
use pecuniary compensation to the general public for being de-
prived of the common use of the portion thus appropriated."7
As noted, streets, rights-of-way and other public property
are held in trust for the benefit of the public at large.98 In New
York, highways are intended principally for use by pedestrians
and travelers; other uses are permitted but are subordinate. 99
The right to use the public highway for purposes other than
travel is a special privilege which cannot be acquired by
purchase or condemnation but only by grant from the proper
public authorities. Perhaps, most significantly, a privilege or
right can be granted for highway use only where the use has a
public purpose.100
The historical vehicle for regulating street use is the street
96. 148 U.S. 92 (1893).
97. Id. at 98, 99, 101-02.
98. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 U.S.
390 (1900).
Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their com-
munities' streets open and available for movement of people and property, the
primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated. So long as legislation to this
end does not abridge the constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to
impart information through speech or the distribution of literature, it may law-
fully regulate the conduct of those using the street.
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added).
99. People v. Squire, 107 N.Y. 593, 14 N.E. 820 (1888) aff'd, 145 U.S. 175 (1892).
100. City of New York v. Rice, 198 N.Y. 124, 91 N.E. 283 (1910); American Rapid
Tel. Co. v. Hess, 125 N.Y. 641, 26 N.E. 919 (1891).
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franchise. Although the differences between broadcasting and
cable television may not be substantial in a way that justifies
significantly different regulatory principles, there is a fundamen-
tal distinction between the authorization to use the airwaves and
authorization to use the streets. The permission necessary to
broadcast is manifest in a license issued by the FCC pursuant to
statute. The special privilege by which a person is authorized to
physically occupy and use public streets and rights-of-way is the
franchise. "No person is to have anything in the nature of a
property right . . . [in] a license."'' ° A franchise, once accepted,
is a property right 02 which cannot be defeated without cause
except through the power of eminent domain'0 3 and which is
subject to the constitutional restriction on the impairment of
contracts.
1 0 4
Congress has affirmed the concept of franchise as con-
tract.105 Because the franchisee possesses a valuable property
right and because the franchising authority holds title to public
streets and rights-of-way as trustee for the benefit of the public,
the grant and award of a franchise is subject to state constitu-
tional provisions requiring just and fair compensation for the
right. In New York, for example, Article VIII Section 1 of the
101. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. at 470, 475 (1940).
102. See City of Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58 (1913) hold-
ing that the grant of franchise is the grant of a property right that may be 'perpetual'.
"That an ordinance granting the right to place and maintain upon the streets of a
city poles and wires of such a company is the granting of a property right, has
been too many times decided by this court to need more than a reference to some
of the later cases .... As a property right it was assignable, taxable and alienable.
Generally, it is an asset of great value . . .and a principal basis for credit."
Id. at 65 (cases omitted).
"The original source of power over both streets and highways is the State." Id. at 67.
103. Delaware, L. & WR.R. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928); Pennsylva-
nia Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas &
Electric Corp., 251 U.S. 32 (1919).
104. Ohio Pub. Serv. Co. v. Ohio, 274 U.S. 12 (1927).
105. The term franchise is defined broadly and includes a "contract... [or] agree-
ment... which authorizes the construction or operation of a cable system .. " 47 U.S.C.
§ 522(8) (Supp. III 1985). The Cable Act anticipates "a request for proposals" (47 U.S.C.
§§ 531, 544), permits agreement by the parties (47 U.S.C. § 542) and generally, if not
exclusively, provides for the enforcement of requirements in a franchise (47 U.S.C. §§
531, 544, 552). Moreover, the statute contains provisions relative to "grandfathering" (47
U.S.C. § 557), franchise modification (47 U.S.C. § 545) and the valuation of a cable sys-
tem upon termination of a franchise (47 U.S.C. § 547) which are based specifically upon
contract and property-right principles.
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State Constitution provides that "[N]o county, city, town, vil-
lage or school district shall give or loan any money or property
to or in aid of any individual, or private corporation or associa-
tion, or private undertaking. 1
III. Communications Regulations and the First Amendment
A. The Standard of Review for Broadcasting Regulation
In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,107 the Su-
preme Court recently reaffirmed the "unique considerations" of
broadcast regulation while striking down a federal statutory ban
on editorializing by noncommercial educational broadcasting
stations. In reviewing the "fundamental principles that guide...
[its] evaluation of broadcast regulation,' 0 8 the Court noted that:
1) broadcasting is still "a new medium;"' 0 9 2) broadcast frequen-
cies remain a "scarce and valuable national resource"'"0 that
Congress may regulate pursuant to the commerce clause through
a licensing process; and 3) Congress "may.. . seek to assure that
the public receives through this medium a balanced presentation
of information on issues of public importance that otherwise
might not be addressed if control of the medium were left en-
tirely in the hands of those who own and operate broadcasting
stations.""' Quoting from Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC"2
and CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,"3 the Court
endorsed the notion that broadcast licensees act, in part, as fidu-
ciaries for the public."4 The Court also endorsed its holding in
Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. FCC" 5 "that broadcasters
are engaged in a vital and independent form of communicative
activity . . . [and are] entitled under the First Amendment to
exercise 'the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their
106. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
107. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
108. Id. at 376.
109. Id. at 377.
110. Id. at 376.
111. Id. at 377.
112. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
113. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
114. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377.
115. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
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public [duties].'" '116 Thus, restrictions on broadcasting that
would not obtain for certain other media "have been upheld
only when ... [the Court was] satisfied that the restriction is
narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest,
such as insuring adequate and balanced coverage of public
issues."' 7
The issue before the Court in League of Women Voters was
the constitutionality of section 399 of the Public Broadcasting
Act of 1967,118 a restriction "directed at a form of speech ...
that lies at the heart of First Amendment protection."" 9 The
scope of the restriction was "defined solely on the basis of the
content of the suppressed speech. ' 120 The Court affirmed the de-
cision of the district court ruling the statute unconstitutional
under the first amendment. However, noting that it had never
gone as far as requiring a compelling government interest in the
evaluation of broadcast regulation, 21 the Court did not apply
the most exacting standard of review for first amendment issues.
Rather, the Court found that the statute was not "narrowly tai-
lored to serve a substantial governmental interest.' ' 22
B. Cable Television Regulation
The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether gov-
ernment regulation of cable television is subject to the same
standard of review applicable to broadcast regulation, i.e.,
whether essential characteristics of cable television are similar to
the distinctive characteristics of broadcasting or whether cable
television may itself have distinctive characteristics requiring a
special standard of review for government regulation. In particu-
lar, the Court has not had occasion to determine whether the
scarcity characteristic of broadcasting finds an analog in cable
television.
116. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 378 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting
Sys. v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 395 and Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.
412 U.S. at 110).
117. Id. at 380.
118. 47 U.S.C. § 390 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
119. 468 U.S. at 381.
120. Id. at 383.
121. Id. at 376.
122. Id. at 380.
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In City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications,
Inc.,23 the Supreme Court intimated that the "scarcity" issue
might be relevant to cable television. The Court noted that
"[the well-pleaded facts in the complaint include allegations of
sufficient excess physical capacity and economic demand for
cable television operators in the area which respondent sought
to serve."' 24 Final judgment on the proper first amendment
analysis was deferred pending the receipt of more information
about the "present uses of the public utility poles and rights-of-
way and how respondent proposes to install and maintain its fa-
cilities on them."'2 5 However, the Court also suggested that scar-
city may not be dispositive. Quoting from recent public forum
cases, the Court noted that "[e]ven protected speech is not
equally permissible in all places and at all times"'26 and that
"where speech and conduct are joined in a single course of ac-
tion, the First Amendment values must be balanced against
competing societal interests.' 27 Whether or not scarcity is criti-
cal to the standard of review applicable to cable television regu-
lation, the issue has not always received a comprehensive, in-
depth analysis.
C. Broadcasting and Cablecasting - Is There a Difference?
In an often cited phrase, the Supreme Court has observed
that "[e]ach medium of expression, of course, must be assessed
for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for
each may present its own problems."' 128
In Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,'29 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia found that "an essential precondition
of... [the regulation of broadcasting] theory - physical inter-
ference and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for govern-
ment - is absent"'30 in cable television. The court found no
"apparent physical scarcity of channels relative to the number of
123. 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
124. Id. at 2036.
125. Id. at 2038 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 2037 (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 2038.
128. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
129. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
130. Id. at 45.
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persons who may seek access to the cable system [and observed
that] cable systems have the capacity to convey over thirty-five
channels of programming.''131
In Quincy Cable TV v. FCC,"2 the same court again distin-
guished cable television technology from broadcasting and noted
that "the inescapable physical limitations on the number of
voices that can simultaneously be carried over the electromag-
netic spectrum .. .[were] limitations .. . [which] engendered a
peculiar irony of the broadcast medium: limited regulation, by
converting aural and visual chaos into channels of effective com-
munication ...."133 The irony of the Quincy case is that the
court distinguishes cable television on the basis of its "virtually
unlimited channel capacity"""4 when, in fact, the petitioner's
system was a twelve-channel system at the commencement of
the proceeding, and all twelve channels were in use.135 The num-
ber of voices that could speak by cable was limited. 3 ' The de-
mand was greater than the capacity which, in fact, was no
greater than the number of local VHF broadcast signals availa-
ble for viewing on any television set.137 Based on the facts, it is
perhaps not surprising that the primary constitutional objection
to the FCC's "must-carry" signal carriage rules' 38 was not the
intrusive effect upon the cable operator, but the adverse impact
on the would-be cable programmer. The court found "most im-
portantly, [that] if a system's channel capacity is substantially
or completely occupied by mandatory signals, the rules prevent
131. Id.
132. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub. nom. National Ass'n of Broad-
casters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986).
133. 768 F.2d at 1448-49. Eight years after Home Box Office, the court noted that
"[ulnlike ordinary broadcast television, which transmits the video image over airwaves
capable of bearing only a limited number of signals, cable reaches the home over a coax-
ial cable with the technological capacity to carry 200 or more channels." Id. at 1448.
134. Id. at 1450.
135. Id. at 1447 n.28.
136. The number of voices based upon the abundant channel capacity of any partic-
ular cable system is not the real issue in the current first amendment challenges to the
cable television franchising procedure. The Supreme Court has noted the contention of
Preferred Communications that the legitimate concerns of the City of Los Angeles are
easily satisfied without the need to limit entry to cable television to a single speaker.
Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2037.
137. Cf. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 45.
138. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-76.61 (1985).
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cable programmers from reaching their intended audiences even
if that result directly contravenes the preference of cable
subscribers." 39
In both HBO and Quincy, the regulations under review were
FCC rules which either precluded or required carriage of various
types of programming by cable operators. In each case, the court
refused to characterize the regulations as content regulations. In
fact, the rules in each case were designed to protect local broad-
casting from cable television. 4" Also, in each case, the court ap-
plied the standard of review set forth in United States v.
O'Brien,' finding in HBO that the rules were overbroad on the
record presented and in Quincy that the rules were overinclusive
"in their indiscriminate protection of every broadcaster regard-
less of whether or to what degree the affected cable system poses
a threat to its economic well-being. 1'4 2
In Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 43 a
content-based municipal ordinance concerning cable television
was declared unconstitutional. In support of its efforts to pro-
hibit the transmission of indecent material by cable, the City of
Roy argued that cable television was similar to broadcasting and
that its authority to regulate cable was analogous to the regula-
tory power of the FCC. 144 The City also argued that its regula-
tory effort was justified by the uniquely pervasive presence char-
acteristic of television, invoked by the Supreme Court' 45 as a
basis for government regulation of broadcasting.
139. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1453 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 1453; Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 50-51.
141. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Where "speech" and "nonspeech" conduct are joined, a
governmental regulation affecting "speech" is sufficiently justified
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest; if the govermental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Id. at 377.
142. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1461. It should be noted that the court applied the O'Brien
standard reluctantly. The court did seem to be attracted to the cable television-newspa-
per analogy, but it did not go so far as to employ a first amendment standard of analysis
applicable to the print media.
143. 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982).
144. Id. at 1166.
145. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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The court rejected both contentions and offered a number
of essential differences between cable television and broadcast
television.1" The court emphasized that cable television pro-
gramming is transmitted to a subscribing audience via wire
which is privately owned in contrast to broadcast television
which is transmitted to non-paying viewers through publicly
owned airwaves. In this context, the court did not agree with the
City's attempt to analogize cable to broadcasting. The court
stated that "[tlhere is no such public interest charged to a cable
distributor [similar to a broadcaster] and at least in theory, no
physical limitation on the number of wires available to carry
electronic signals. 1 4
7
In Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found only a "super-
ficial similarity between broadcasting and cable television." 1"
The court stated that the "electromagnetic spectrum simply is
physically incapable of carrying the messages of all who wish to
use the medium ' 149 and concluded that "[w]ithout licensing, the
broadcast spectrum would be rendered virtually useless to
all." 150 As in Quincy, the court seemed to imply that the mere
existence of cable television technology will enable every voice to
146. Community Television, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982).
147. Id. at 1169.
148. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.
1985). In making the distinction between broadcasting and cable television, the court
seems to merge the issue of frequency interference inherent in radio broadcasting with
the physical scarcity of separate frequency wavelengths. The court noted, referring to
HBO and Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir.
1982), that "[m]ore recent cases have expressly concluded that the physical scarcity ra-
tionale does not apply to cable." Id. at 1404. The court further stated that "[Firequency
interferrence [is] a problem that does not arise with cable television." Id. (quoting
Omega, 694 F.2d at 127).
The issue of interference is distinct from scarcity of frequencies and is not unique to
communication by radio wave. Interference among speakers may result in a variety of
circumstances including simultaneous street demonstrations, pickets or parades. For ex-
ample, in Omega, the court noted that "cable television involves another type of interfer-
ence - interference with other users of telephone poles and underground ducts." 694
F.2d at 127.
Surely, it is necessary to license broadcasters to prevent frequency interference.
However, regulation of speech and other conduct rests finally upon the limited number
of separate frequencies. The court in Omega did not compare cable television to broad-
casting for this purpose.
149. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1403.
150. Id. at 1404.
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use television to communicate its message. On the other hand, it
is asserted that the proper analogy does not involve lay speakers
but licensees.
D. Cable Television as a Scarce Commodity
The technical capacity of a single cable television wire to
transmit many channels of information simultaneously does not
invalidate the "scarcity" rationale. Nor does the possibility of a
multitude of cable wires providing an infinite number of cable
channels distinguish cable television from broadcast television
with respect to licensing matters. Cable television is to broadcast
television as: 1) a single cable system is to a single broadcast
frequency; 2) the public rights-of-way are to the electromagnetic
spectrum; and 3) the cable television franchise is to the broad-
cast license.
1. Physical Scarcity
A cable system, like a single broadcast frequency, perma-
nently and exclusively occupies a portion of a "scarce and valua-
ble" resource. The public right-of-way is limited. The height and
available space on existing utility poles is more limited yet. As
with the electromagnetic spectrum, public rights-of-
way - including poles - must, by necessity, be dedicated by
law to other public purposes. The transmission of electronic
messages - whether by video or otherwise - is but one of a
number of necessary purposes that compete for use of the public
rights-of-way. Whereas dozens of broadcast television frequen-
cies are available for licensing in a single community, it is un-
likely that existing utility poles could accommodate more than
two separate television cables without substantial and costly ad-
justments.15" ' Moreover, the authority of the cable television
franchise under the Cable Communications Policy Act, like the
authority of the broadcast license, confers upon a single entity
151. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-91 (1969).
"Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively small number of licen-
sees, in a Nation of 200,000,000, the Government could surely have decreed that
each frequency should be shared among all or some of those who wish to use it,
each being assigned a portion of the broadcast day or the broadcast week.
1986]
29
PACE LAW REVIEW
the power, subject only to government regulation, to determine
the content of the programming. It is tempting to compare a
seventy-channel cable system or a fifty-four-channel cable sys-
tem or even a thirty-six-channel cable system with the number
of local television broadcasting stations in the same community
and conclude that cable television is a medium of abundance.
However, on further examination, and for so long as a cable sys-
tem - rather than individual channels - is franchised to a
single individual or entity, one cable system is tantamount to
one additional broadcast licensee in any community.
Whether the "medium" of cable television is in any sense
scarce must depend, not on the technological capacity of the sin-
gle cable wire, but upon either of two circumstances - the
availability of space in the right-of-way or the feasibility of com-
petition. 152 In Preferred Communications, plaintiff sought access
to utility poles - public and private - in the City of Los An-
geles for the purpose of constructing a cable television system in
a region for which a franchise had been previously awarded by
the City. The company's request for access was denied because
it did not have a franchise from the City. The company's request
for a franchise was denied by the City because it had not partici-
pated in the City's competitive bidding (or auction) process by
which cable franchises are awarded. The plaintiff then brought
suit against the City, in part, upon the grounds that it had been
deprived of rights guaranteed by the first amendment.
The issue phrased by the Court of Appeals was:
Can the City, consistent with the First Amendment, limit access
by means of an auction process to a given region of the City to a
single cable television company, when the public utility facilities
and other public property in that region necessary to the installa-
tion and operation of a cable television system are physically ca-
pable of accommodating more than one system?'6s
The court answered the question in the negative. 154
152. Cf. Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976
(D.R.I. 1983). "For this court, at least, scarcity is scarcity - its particular source,
whether 'physical' or 'economic', does not matter if its effect is to remove from all but a
small group an important means of expressing ideas." Id. at 986-87 (footnote omitted).
153. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1401.
154. Id. at 1402.
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Under the facts as alleged, the court determined that the
use of the franchise auction process to limit the number of
franchises to one was not the least restrictive means available to
the city to further its interests in protecting public resources. 155
The court stated conclusively that "the physical scarcity that
could justify increased regulation of cable operations does not
exist in this case.' ' 56
In Preferred Communications, the question of whether the
scarcity rationale applies to cable television was raised and dis-
cussed in terms of available space on existing utility poles and in
existing ducts and conduits rather than in terms of the availabil-
ity of suitable space within the totality of the public right-of-
way. 157 Although cable television franchises encourage the joint
use of existing utility facilities (for aesthetic reasons and to min-
imize disruption of the highways) and Congress has asserted ju-
risdiction over cable television pole attachment rates, 58 it is
doubtful that a cable television franchisee even has a right of
access to utility property in many jurisdictions.3 9 Under the cir-
cumstances, it is not self-evident that first amendment analysis
of cable television regulation should be determined upon the ba-
sis of poles and ducts most often constructed in another era by
private utility companies for different purposes. Since utility
property is not always available and because cable television
franchises routinely empower the franchisee to erect its own
poles and conduits, a comprehensive examination of "physical
scarcity" must include the possibility of future construction by
the franchisee of separate poles or additional wires. A franchise
creates a long-term relationship and a valuable property right.
Once a franchise is vested, it is unreasonable to anticipate that
expansion or new construction can be readily avoided by sum-
mary denial of a permit to place additional poles or to construct
155. Id. at 1406.
156. Id. at 1404. The court expressed "no opinion on the issue of the manner in
which the City should allocate access to poles and conduits to competing cable systems
when ... [those] structures are incapable of accommodating all those seeking access." Id.
157. Id.
158. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1) (1982).
159. In Los Angeles, some utility poles and ducts were owned and maintained by the
city and, as noted, state law required private utilities to make space available for the
attachment of television cable. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1400.
1986]
31
PACE LAW REVIEW
new conduits.
In fact, the evaluation of first amendment issues based upon
the availability of space on existing utility structures suggests
that the medium of cable television has - or should have - a
right of access to private utility property which may, itself, be
scarce. However, the Supreme Court has determined that utility
poles are not public forum property and has denied right of ac-
cess to them. 160
Shortly after the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Preferred
Communications, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia in Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United
States 6 ' (TCI of Key West) determined that an incumbent
cable television franchisee which had been denied a renewal in
favor of an invited competitive bidder had stated a first amend-
ment claim under public forum jurisprudence. e16 Defendant was
a U.S. Air Force base. Plaintiff TCI of Key West alleged that the
"rights-of-way necessary to conduct cable television services had
been dedicated to such use . . . [that] no legal or practical bur-
dens would accrue from two cable television companies compet-
ing and [that TCII in no way indicated that more than two com-
panies might end up competing." '63
The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds
that the rights-of-way were not traditional public fora and that
the Air Force had asserted legitimate military objectives that
were content neutral. The court of appeals found that the dis-
trict court had improperly relied upon factual assumptions other
than those set forth in the complaint and reversed. It should be
noted that because TCI of Key West alleged "there were no rea-
sons for restricting speech, 16 4 the court found that it was not
160. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814 (1984) (upholding a
municipal ordinance banning the use of utility poles and other public property for the
posting of signs). In Preferred Communications, the court of appeals attempted to dis-
tinguish Vincent on the grounds that the attachment of coaxial cable to utility poles is
basically compatible with the normal use of those facilities. The court concluded that for
purposes of cable television the utility poles were public forum property, noting the exis-
tence of a state statute which apparently dedicates surplus space and utility poles to
cable. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1408-09.
161. 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
162. Id. at 1338.
163. Id. at 1336.
164. Id. at 1338.
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actually necessary to determine whether the rights-of-way were
public forum or nonforum property. 6 '
In TCI of Key West, public forum jurisprudence was ap-
plied to government-owned property, i.e., a U.S. military base.
In Preferred Communications, the public forum analysis per-
tained, in part, to publicly owned utility poles. Of course, poles
and conduits are often privately owned. The Ninth Circuit did
not attempt to explain how private utility property can be con-
verted to public forum property. It would seem, however, if pri-
vate property can constitute a public forum under certain cir-
cumstances, 168 then a privately owned cable television system
would also be subject to public forum analysis, in which event
the public, educational and governmental as well as the commer-
cial leased access provisions of the Cable Communications Policy
Act would not satisfy the first amendment rights of third party
users. Even the poles and conduits owned by cable television
systems might acquire the same status as privately owned utility
poles. The Supreme Court in Preferred Communications did not
adopt the analysis of the Ninth Circuit but does anticipate a
public forum dimension. The Court quotes from Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.17 that
"[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places
and at all times."' 68 The Court also suggests that City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent 69 is relevant to the ultimate determina-
tion. "Moreover, where speech and conduct are joined in a single
course of action, the First Amendment values must be balanced
against competing societal interests.'17 0
The application of public forum analysis to cable television
franchising should include a comprehensive evaluation of: 1) the
totality of the public right-of-way; 2) other uses for which the
right-of-way is dedicated in the public interest; 3) the potential
for expansion of the right-of-way by the exercise of eminent do-
165. Id. at 1338-39.
166. Cf. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), (upholding right
of public to use privately owned shopping center for leafletting and soliciting signatures).
167. 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985).
168. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2037 (quoting Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at
3448).
169. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
170. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2038.
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main of the franchising authority; and 4) the statutory direction
that a franchise shall include the right to use private easements
dedicated for compatible uses.' 7 ' In addition, and perhaps most
significantly, it is necessary to reconcile an alleged "right of ac-
cess" to government property for would-be cable operators with
an historic and present understanding that a cable television
franchise is a valuable and enduring property right for which
governments traditionally have been entitled to fair compensa-
tion. If it is determined that every decision by local governments
to permit the construction of a cable television system by a pri-
vate entity necessarily converts the public right-of-way into a
public forum and thereby inhibits the discretion of local govern-
ment, then a possible response may be the abandonment of pri-
vate television franchising in favor of municipally owned cable
systems. 72 Under municipal ownership, the cable system itself
could constitute a dedicated public forum with channels availa-
ble to those who would choose to speak only.
In Preferred Communications, the City of Los Angeles did
not deny the existence of sufficient available space on utility
poles for a second cable television system. In other cases, munic-
ipal governments have argued that some limit exists.' 73 It does
not appear, however, that a case exists where it was found that
the existing poles could support one and only one cable televi-
171. Section 521(a)(2) of the Cable Communications Policy Act provides that:
"[any franchise shall be construed to authorize the construction of a cable system over
public rights-of-way, and through easements, which is within the area to be served by
the cable system and which have been dedicated for compatible uses .... 47 U.S.C. §
541(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
172. "It would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and further-
ing communications, prevented the Government from making radio communications pos-
sible by requiring licenses to broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as not
to overcrowd the spectrum." Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
173. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.
1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982) (The City alleged that there was "a sheer
limit on the number of cables that can be strung on existing telephone poles." Id. at
1378); Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
("[Tihere may be some practical limit to the number of coaxial cables that may be hung
from utility poles or buried underground." Id. at 1563); Cf. Carlson v. Village of Union
City, 601 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Mich. 1985) ("Defendants do not argue that the facts of
this case support a theory of physical scarcity. Although the capacity of the village's
utility poles to safely support television cables may at some point be limited, no one has
suggested that the poles could support only one such cable." Id. at 811 n.9).
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sion system.'74
2. Economic Scarcity
A second aspect of the "scarcity" issue is economic scarcity.
In Preferred Communications, for example, the plaintiff alleged
that the region of the city in question could support more than
one cable television system. The City argued that cable televi-
sion was a natural monopoly. The natural monopolistic charac-
ter of the cable television medium has been alternately assumed
by the courts and avoided on the grounds of an insufficient fac-
tual record.' 75
In Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision,
Inc., a jury in federal district court found that cable television
in Jefferson City, Missouri, was a natural monopoly. The district
court observed that
[aiccording to ... [its] research, this is the first case in which the
174. "The Court is aware of no case upholding the right of a municipality to deny a
CTV franchise or license on the basis of physical scarcity." Century Federal, 579 F.
Supp. at 1563.
175. Hopkinsville Cable TV v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543 (W.D.
Ky. 1982) ("A Cable television system, by nature, tends to be a natural monopoly." Id. at
547); Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 976.
Such a [competitive] franchising system recognizes the economic realities of the
cable industry, which, as a practical matter, create a "natural monopoly" for the
first cable operator to construct a cable system in a given service area. Testimony
in this case established that to construct the Newport County cable system would
cost approximately seven million dollars. Because of these start-up costs and the
nature of the cable television market [citation omitted], the cable systems have
operated largely free from competition.
Id. at 986.
In Community Communications and Omega, the courts assumed some degree of natural
monopoly but refused conclusive findings in the absence of a detailed factual record.
Only in Carlson was there no dispute about the issue.
Both parties have conceded that the cable television industry in Union City has
the characteristics of a natural monopoly. Defendant has indicated that ". . . the
size of the municipality (the Village of Union City consists of between 600 and 700
residences) effectively discourages any other cable companies from attempting to
compete with a franchise holder.
Carlson, 601 F. Supp. at 810 n.8.
The court further noted that "courts have limited their reliance on a theory of 'economic
scarcity' expressly because it was not clear whether, on the facts of that particular case,
cable television was indeed functioning as a monopoly. In this case, that fact is not in
dispute." Id. at 811 n.10.
176. 610 F. Supp. 891 (D. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986).
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question of whether a natural monopoly situation exists with re-
spect to a cable television market has been submitted to a jury...
[and that it] is convinced that treating the natural monopoly is-
sue as a question of fact was proper; in each case, the issue will
turn on a variety of particularized factors ranging from the popu-
lation density of a given community to the age and height of its
utility poles. 7 '
In Central Telecommunications, the City was not a party to
the litigation. The plaintiff had applied for a franchise in re-
sponse to a request for proposals issued by the City in the con-
text of the forthcoming expiration of defendant's franchise. The
city council approved the grant of a franchise to plaintiff but the
action was vetoed by the Mayor. Subsequently, the City acted to
renew the defendant's franchise. The plaintiff brought suit
against the incumbent cable television franchisee on antitrust
grounds and for interference with its efforts to obtain a
franchise. Defendant asserted that it had a right under the first
amendment to provide cable television service in the
City - with or without a franchise - and also that the City
was constrained from refusing to permit any franchise applicant
from providing service. In essence, defendant argued that it
could not be held accountable for the City's unconstitutional re-
fusal to franchise the plaintiff.
The case was submitted to the jury on three theories: "1)
conspiracy to unreasonably restrain trade; 2) actual monopoliza-
tion; and 3) tortious interference with a business expectancy. "178
On the issue of entry regulation, the court stated that
in a natural monopoly situation, the First Amendment should tol-
erate a franchising process whereby a city may periodically award
an exclusive franchise to the applicant which offers the best pack-
age to the public. On the other hand, if a given cable television
market does not have natural monopoly characteristics, the justi-
fication for limiting the number of franchisees disappears. 179
The "determinative factor" of the number of franchises is
"whether economic and physical conditions in the relevant mar-
177. Id. at 901 n.33.
178. Id. at 896.
179. Id. at 900.
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ket give rise to a 'natural monopoly' situation."'180
In affirming the district court (including the jury verdict),
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized the
"profound first amendment implications inherent in the regula-
tion of cable operators ... [and made] clear, as did the Supreme
Court in Preferred Communications, that ... [it was] unwilling
to decide any question which .. .[was] not squarely before ...
[it] and on which there... [had] not been a full development of
the record."' 81 It conceded that both parties had a first amend-
ment interest in being a "cable television 'speaker'" while con-
cluding that "[b]ecause the evidence shows that given the tech-
nology offered by the competing companies, there was economic
capacity for only one speaker, it seems clear that . . . [Central
Telecommunication's] proposal went further in advancing the
First Amendment interests of the viewing public in the greatest
variety of programming obtainable. "182
E. Beyond Scarcity: Additional Governmental Interests
Since Preferred Communications, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has affirmed its refusal to grant injunctive re-
lief to a would-be cable television system builder and operator
who did not adhere to the requirements of an exclusive proce-
dure for awarding a single cable television franchise.' For ex-
ample, in Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento,8 4 the
court explained that the relief sought would "authorize Pacific
West to string its cables on Sacramento's utility poles and to lay
its cable in utility conduits under Sacramento's streets without
regard to the number of others who might seek similar relief or
to the ultimate capacity of the poles or conduits."' 8 5 The court
held that such an injunction would "infring[e] the legitimate
power of Sacramento to prevent disruption of the public do-
main. ' '1 as "At the very least, Sacramento may regulate the
noncommunicative aspects of cable broadcasting through rea-
180. Id. at 900-01.
181. 800 F.2d at 716.
182. Id. at 717 (emphasis added).
183. Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 798 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1986).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 355.
186. Id.
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sonable time, place and manner restrictions" '87 through a system
"for the allocation of Sacramento's utility resources.' '188
The legitimate power to prevent disruption of the public do-
main constitutes a substantial governmental interest underlying
entry regulation of private cable television systems. This govern-
mental interest supplies a rational basis for a franchising process
and anticipates the need to limit the number of cable systems. It
does not depend upon "physical scarcity" but it may be fortified
by scarcity - physical or economic. It is the context in which
every governmental determination to permit the construction of
a cable television system must be made.
That no person may construct a cable television system
without local governmental action is also consistent with section
541 of the Cable Act."8" Indeed, under both historic principles of
street use and modern federal communications law, no person
has a first amendment right to build a cable television system
without a franchise. Conversely, there is no constitutional obli-
gation per se to allow any person to use public streets and
rights-of-way for the purpose of building a cable system. From
this perspective, the public property required for a cable system
is not traditional public forum property. 190 Even though cable
television "partakes of some of the aspects of speech and the
communication of ideas,"1 91 the need for a franchise and the im-
plicit power to deny a franchise are consistent with the many
holdings of the Supreme Court that there is no first amendment
right permitting access to every kind of government property at
all times and places. 92
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Id.
189. Neither section 541 nor state laws or ordinances requiring franchises or licenses
constitute facially invalid prior restraints on speech. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147 (1939) (local ordinances banning or restricting local canvassing and leaflet-
ting held unconstitutional as violative of first amendment).
190. Traditional or quintessential public forum property includes streets and parks
which have historically been devoted to assembly and debate. The public forum doctrine
preceded the advent of cable television technology. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939).
191. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. 2034, 2037 (1986).
192. "[Tlhe First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because
it is owned or controlled by the government." United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981).
Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places at all times. Noth-
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A local governmental franchise is essential for the construc-
tion of a cable system by a private entity, but local government
is not compelled to grant a franchise. Therefore, the local
franchising process may be characterized as a system for selec-
tive access to public property for the construction of a cable sys-
tem. The Supreme Court has recognized the ability of govern-
ment to create a limited public forum for public
communication. 193 In such cases, the Court has indicated that
the right of access does not extend to all"" and that "selective
access [granted by government] does not transform government
property into a public forum [even a limited one]." 195 In both
Perry and Cornelius, the Court upheld limited access on the ba-
sis of reasonable viewpoint-neutral distinctions made in light of
the purpose of the forum. Such cases suggest that it is within
the constitutional power of government to prescribe the scope of
the forum and that local government may decide to dedicate
public property sufficient for the erection of a single privately
owned television system.
In accord with Central Telecommunications, limited access
to the public right-of-way is required where economic scarcity
exists. 196 The obvious question is whether a local government
must prove in every case that cable television will be a natural
monopoly in order to support an exclusive franchising proce-
dure.1 97 Such a requirement seems too restrictive and overlooks
ing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who
wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of government property
without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be
caused by the speaker's activities.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448 (1985).
" 'The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the prop-
erty under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.'" Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)).
193. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Cor-
nelius 105 S.Ct. at 3449-50.
194. Perry, 460 U.S. at 48.
195. Id. at 47. "The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a non-traditional forum
for public discourse." Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3449.
196. Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 891,
899-901 (D. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986).
197. In this regard, a practical as well as a legal question arises. Specifically, to what
extent must a municipality or city be prepared to support a claim of economic scarcity?
It seems that a standard which requires a city to conduct a comprehensive, in-depth,
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other affirmative governmental interests.
Congress has determined to promote cable television tech-
nology consistent with the needs and interests of the local com-
munity198 and to "assure that cable communications provide and
are encouraged to provide the widest possible diversity of infor-
mation sources and services to the public ... ."199 The statute
recognizes the responsibility of local governments to determine
cable-related community needs and interests;200 to assure that
the opportunity to subscribe to cable service is not denied on the
basis of income 201 or geography; 202 to designate channel capac-
ity;20 3 and to require the availability of public, educational and
governmental access.20' In sum, the local governmental interests
include the promotion of diversity through the issuance of cable
television franchises consistent with the first amendment and
the rights of citizens to have access to information distributed
by use of public property.
In the context of these affirmative governmental interests, it
cannot be assumed that the refusal to grant a second or addi-
tional cable systems will impede either diversity or competition
in the "marketplace of ideas." The technology of cable television
is such that a second system is not needed to expand the chan-
nels of information that may be utilized. Congress, of course, has
rejected the notion that the cable television franchisee should
have the unequivocal right to control either the capacity of the
system to be built or the programming to be provided on each
and every channel. Nor is competition in the "marketplace of
expensive study in every instance would be wasteful; instead, a city should be able to
rely on findings of other similar communities.
The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting [a zoning ordinance
prohibiting adult movie theaters near residential property] . . . to conduct new
studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities,
so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be rele-
vant to the problem that the city addresses.
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 931 (1986).
198. 47 U.S.C. § 521(2) (Supp. III 1985).
199. Id. § 521(4).
200. Id. §§ 531(b), 546(a).
201. Id. § 541(3).
202. HR. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 4696.
203. 47 U.S.C. § 531.
204. Id.
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ideas" necessarily served by additional cable systems. Congress
has determined that cable television systems in large numbers
may be subject to effective competition from alternative delivery
systems. The FCC has more recently determined that broadcast
television alone suffices to cause competition with cable televi-
sion205 Neither Congress nor the FCC has emphasized that ef-
fective competition would be found by overlapping cable sys-
tems, most likely because of the rarity with which this occurs.
Indeed, the jury determination in Central Telecommunications
that cable television in Jefferson City was a natural monopoly
seems entirely consistent with federal governmental assumptions
about the nature of cable television.
The ultimate criterion for determining the constitutionality
of a franchising scheme which provides for limited selective ac-
cess to public property for the construction of a cable television
system is whether the reasonable regulation is content-neu-
tral.0 6 In Central Telecommunications, the court explicitly
stated that "there is no question here of content regulation in
determining who would be the 'best' applicant. ' 2 7 If local gov-
ernmental action has influenced the content of programming, it
is likely to have been attributable, in part, to two aspects of
cable television. First, the private cable operator and the govern-
ment share an interest in the availability of a wide variety of
programming and information. Even Congress permits a cable
operator to commit to offer broad categories of programming. In
such instances, Congress allows a local franchising authority to
enforce the programming commitment.208
Second, because of the federal ceiling on the amount of
205. Report and Order in MM Docket 84-1296, 55 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1 (1985).
206. [G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it
finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or
debating in public facilities .... Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speak-
ing by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or
speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a pub-
lic forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by refer-
ence to content alone.
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
207. Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711, 714
n.4. (8th Cir. 1986).
208. 47 U.S.C. § 544 (Supp. III 1985).
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monetary consideration, i.e. franchise fees,20 9 to be paid by the
cable operator to the local government, franchising authorities
have been precluded from selecting a franchisee solely on the
basis of the highest bid. Thus, franchising authorities have been
motivated to "quantify" services as part of the selection process
and to review programming line-ups. Under the Cable Act, how-
ever, local governments may not insist upon requirements for
specific programming.210
To be sure, the risk that franchising could impinge upon the
content of protected speech cannot ever be lightly disregarded.
However, this risk is mitigated by the very nature of the tech-
nology. With so many separate channels of communication avail-
able, the truly "expressive speech" interests of the cable opera-
tor are almost indeterminate. Certain programming or channels
by themselves might be afforded the highest degree of first
amendment protection while other channels and messages
standing alone would receive considerably less constitutional
protection. A cable system is not uniformly engaged in "the ex-
pression of editorial opinions [on public issues] .. .that lies at
the heart of first amendment protection. '211 Recently, for exam-
ple, there has been a proliferation of services available to local
cable operators expressly for the direct marketing by video of
commercial goods. The fact that cable television operators exer-
cise editorial discretion in some ways similar to that exercised in
the print media should not be isolated from the separate tradi-
tions which distinguish print from video and newspaper distri-
bution from cable technology. 212
209. Id. § 542.
210. Id. § 544.
211. FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 381 (1984).
212. In Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the court was
attracted to similarities between a cable television company and a newspaper insofar as
first amendment standards of analysis applied. Id. at 1451-54. In City of Los Angeles v.
Preferred Communications, Inc., 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985) as well, the Ninth Circuit
likened cable television to newspapers in that a cable operator exercises editorial control
and judgment over programming. Id. at 1406-07. Both courts relied upon Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), in which the Supreme Court found that
reduced competition in the newspaper business was not cause for permitting governmen-
tal action that would impair or interfere with editorial discretion necessary for a free
press. But the Supreme Court has never held that first amendment rights of newspapers
are unlimited. In FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978),
the Court upheld an FCC regulation prohibiting a newspaper from owning a broadcast
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Although the courts may "not simply assume that . . .[an]
ordinance will always advance the asserted state interests suffi-
ciently to justify its abridgement of expressive activity, ' 213 a
carefully drawn franchising ordinance or regulation that empha-
sizes channel capacity, state-of-the-art technology and the dis-
tinction between the operator's channels and access chan-
nels - without regard to the views and specific programming of
the cable operator - should satisfy the threshold test of con-
tent-neutrality.
If a franchising scheme based upon selective limited access
is to withstand first amendment scrutiny, the distinction be-
tween conduct and expressive or communicative activity cannot
be overemphasized. Denial of the opportunity to build a cable
television system does not constitute denial of the right to speak
via cable television or, indeed, the right to communicate by
video to the home television set. Congress has ensured the abil-
ity - subject to franchise commitments for channel capac-
ity - of "cable speakers" to lease channels and the ability of
franchising authorities to require adequate channel capacity for
public, educational and governmental use.214 Congress has also
expressly prohibited the exercise of editorial control over all
such access by cable operators and over all non-governmental
channels by franchising authorities. These provisions are based
upon historic first amendment considerations. Moreover, if
franchising procedures are ultimately to be judged under a stan-
dard which requires consideration of the existence of alternative
channels of communication for unsuccessful franchise appli-
cants, commercial leased access and access to broadcast licenses
and other licensed and unlicensed distribution systems in the
community are relevant.
The right to speak by means of cable television does not
have to include the right to speak all the time on all the chan-
nels to the exclusion of any other use of the media for expressive
purposes. In short, the existence in a community of other distri-
bution systems - and perhaps even the opportunity to publish
television station in the same market.
213. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. at 2038 (quoting City Council v. Tax-
payers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803 n.22 (1984)).
214. 47 U.S.C. §§ 531, 532.
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a newspaper - should provide ample alternative channels of
communication.
IV. Conclusion
Cable television is a distribution technology. It began as a
means of extending the reach of television broadcast signals and
has since been promoted, in substantial part, for its ability to
provide many channels of communication available for television
programming and, to a lesser extent, as an alternative, competi-
tive means of voice and data transmission. Because cable televi-
sion distributes information and entertainment through use of
public property, both its method and purpose are similar to
broadcast television. Because its use of public property is per-
manent, exclusive and tangible, cable television is also similar to
telephone and other utility distribution systems. Cable television
serves to broaden the electromagnetic spectrum and to "widen
the sidewalks." In either sense, cable television technology
presents the opportunity for the movement of more information,
for more purposes by more people.
The distribution of information via cable television is not
the same distribution protected by the Supreme Court in the
more traditional first amendment cases of the early part of this
century.2 16 The views expressed on cable television are not of-
fered without charge to casual passersby on the street. Cable tel-
evision is in the business of using the streets for distributing in-
formation. However, it also does more. It is, for example, now
used for hawking and peddling wares as in "home shopping." In
fact, the potential uses and services of broadband communica-
tions transcend protected speech.
The distribution of information via cable also differs from
215. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (ordinance forbidding the
distribution of literature without prior permission from the City Manager found uncon-
stitutional on its face). See also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (local
ordinances banning or restricting local canvassing and leafletting held unconstitutional
as violative of first amendment); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (local ordinances
prohibiting distribution of printed matter and prohibiting holding of public meetings in
public places without permits held unconstitutional as violative of first amendment);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (statute forbidding loitering about a place of
business for the purpose of inducing individuals not to patronize that place of business,
and prohibiting publicizing of facts concerning the involvement of this place of business
in a labor dispute, held unconstitutional as violative of first amendment).
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newspapers. The newspaper publisher or pamphleteer takes the
streets as he finds them. The private cable company may widen
the sidewalk but only through the investment of millions of dol-
lars in poles, conduits, cable and electronics on, over or under
real estate held in trust for the public. The resulting cable sys-
tem becomes part of the landscape. The newspaper publisher
works on a deadline from one edition to the next and is pre-
sumed to know, evaluate and choose in advance each word and
image to be distributed. The private cable operator works in a
continuum of time and space; even as to programming within his
exclusive control - much of it live - he is unlikely to preview
every word or image distributed.2 16 The editorial function of the
cable operator is often passive and general.
Government licensing of broadcasting was necessary to
make intelligible distribution possible. It created a new medium
which promised to further the goals of the first amendment.
Regulation of broadcasting has been sustained to promote diver-
sity and to prevent public property from vesting in private inter-
ests solely for private commercial gain. Government franchising
of cable television also makes distribution of programming
possible.
The decision to grant franchises as well as the decisions to
limit the number and choose the franchise holder(s) must all, to
a degree, fulfill the purpose of diversity. In a free society, the
purpose of the first amendment transcends the whims of the
marketplace. As long as the decision on the number of separate
wires and the identity of the private owners does not depend
upon the content of past or proposed speech on issues of public
concern (and at least until we have greater experience with the
medium of television), a regulatory scheme for cable television
including a competitive franchising process which prevents the
appropriation of public property exclusively for private pur-
poses - whether related principally to speech or econom-
216. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
[U]nlike local television broadcasting stations that transmit only one signal and
receive notification from their networks concerning advertisements, cable opera-
tors simultaneously receive and channel to their subscribers a variety of signals
from many sources without any advance notice about the timing or content of
commercial advertisements carried on those signals."
Id. at 707.
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ics - serves the purposes of the first amendment and our fed-
eral form of government.
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